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Mozambique’s national elections in 2009 were paired with national and international 
monitoring programs, characterized by a randomized allocation. By assessing the impact 
of the observers on election outcomes we see evidence of electoral fraud. Moreover, na-
tional fixed observers were found to be  highly capable of deterring fraud and a relation 
between observers and voters’ behaviour was found. National and international have dif-
ferent effects on outcomes and we attribute this fact to the different impact on voters’ and 






Electoral observation, in particular, international monitoring, is becoming the norm throughout the 
developing world. Development economists have recently started to focus on the impact of monitor-
ing in election outcomes, mainly as a fraud-preventing mechanism. However, there isn’t much lit-
erature about the effectiveness of national monitoring, and on the channels through which observers 
can have a direct effect on election-day outcomes. This paper tries to address these two issues using 
official data on the outcomes of the Mozambican elections of 2004 and 2009. In the latter both inter-
national and national observation took place under controlled environments. Both types of monitors 
were randomized making it possible to perform treatment-control analysis. There were national 
fixed monitors, sitting in a single voting table for the entire day, and international observers that were 
mobile, travelling by car and visiting a few number of polling stations during the day. 
By assessing the impact of each monitor on the different outcomes we formulate a frame-
work through which we try to explain how electoral observation is affecting fraudulent procedures, 
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so as to answer our proposed questions: Can national monitors be as effective as international moni-
tors? Through which election-day mechanisms do observers change election outcomes? 
We distinguish between two types of election-day effects of electoral observation: one af-
fecting voters’ behaviour, and the other one affecting ballot table staff’s actions. Evidence is found 
that national and international (or fixed versus mobile) observers differ in their impact on voters and 
the staff. National monitors have a strong deterrence effect on fraud but little impact on voters. 
Whereas international voters have a measurable effect on voters but there was not enough evidence 




The interdependence of the economy and politics has become widely accepted among scholars. 
Downs (1957) successfully approaches elections using economic theory, revealing the importance 
of political accountability to maintain politicians’ incentives in line with their constituencies. Empiri-
cal evidence of accountability importance has also been shown, Besley and Case (1995) compare 
U.S. governs with term limits with those without, to discover a relationship between political ac-
countability and economic policies. Electoral observation is ultimately a way to improve accounta-
bility in the developing world, leaders have a higher incentive not to misbehave in order to please in-
ternational donors who often condition aid on electoral observation Hyde and O’Mahony (2010), 
and to maintain voter support.  International monitors have been found to influence outcomes even 
when elections are viewed as fair Hyde (2010), which is welcomed as appositive evidence of moni-
toring effectiveness. The same author finds again negative correlation between the incumbent and 
international observers in Armenia’s 2004 elections, Hyde (2007). However evidence points that ef-
fects will differ across countries, as is seen in a poor monitoring performance in Zimbabwe’s 2000 
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elections Laakso (2002). Disagreement is present on some key issues as Beaulieu and Hyde (2008) 
show a positive relation between observation and electoral boycott, while Kelley (2011) presents an 
alternative view where specific characteristics are required for boycotts to appear. 
Mozambique is a South African nation that has been the stage for vicious political and mili-
tary struggles during the last decades. Conflicts started in 1964 with the war for independence from 
Portugal that lasted until 1975. When sovereignty was proclaimed, Frelimo
2
, backed by popular and 
military support, seized control of the nation. Soon after, a rival right-wing movement, Renamo
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started to challenge Frelimo whose actions eventually led to a civil war in 1977. The two sides 
fought each other until a truce was signed in 1992 followed by the first democratic elections in 1994. 
Politics in Mozambique are as a consequence marked by fierce competition and aggressive-
ness; it has been difficult for the two main factions to live together under a democratic regime after 
fighting each other for 14 years. As such, political struggle has been marked by constant complaints 
of corruption and fraud. Contesters, including electoral observers and the opposition, often accuse 
Frelimo of rigging elections and of misconduct in political affairs.  Hanlon and Fox (2006) show 
strong evidence of fraud in the 2004 elections favouring the incumbent. I shall use the assumption 
that fraud is in favour of Frelimo throughout the paper.  During the 1994 and 1999 elections 
Frelimo was headed by Joaquim Chissano, in 2004 and 2009 the current president Ar-
mando Guebuza replaced him. The party managed to win all of the four elections.  
 Table1 presents the results of the four presidential elections. We see a clear increasing trend 
favouring Frelimo and a decreasing trend for Renamo , which has been headed by Afonso Dhlaka-
ma since the first elections. The lack of disassociation between the party leader and the party is also 
                                                          
2
 “Frente the Libertação de Moçambique” or Mozambican Liberation Front, is a left-wing party and was 
one of the main armed movements during the war for independence. It has been the country’s main politi-
cal faction since the first democratic elections in 1994. 
3
 “Resistência Nacional Moçambicana” or National Mozambican Resistance. Sponsored by South Africa 
and Rhodesia Renamo is characterized by a right-wing anti-communist ideology. After the truce in 1994 
it was formed as a political party and is now the second biggest political faction in the country. 
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incredibly present in Mozambican politics. Voters act as if the presidential and parliamentary elec-
tion were the same; in fact the correlation between votes for presidential and parliamentary voters for 
Renamo/Dhlakama and Frelimo/Guebuza was 0,94 and 0,91 respectively in the 2009 elections.  
Table 1 
Shares of votes in the Presidential election 
Year Chissano/Guebuza Dhlakama 
1994 53% 35% 
1999 51% 47% 
2004 65% 32% 
2009 75% 16% 
Notes: Vote shares for the last four elections, where Chissano 
was the candidate for Frelimo in 1994 and 1999 and Guebuza 
was in 2004 and 2009. Dhlakama has always been the candi-




Mozambique’s electoral system has been more or less the same throughout the different elections. 
Voters have to register so as to receive an electoral card granting them access to the polling stations. 
These registrations are kept in a register book that holds up to 1000 voters. Inside each polling station 
there will be a ballot table corresponding to a particular register. The voting stations are schools 
whenever possible but poor conditions may sometimes lead to the use of other locations.  
Data on presidential and parliamentary official election results of 2009 and 2004 were pro-
vided by STAE, with entries per ballot table and information on turnout, blanks, nulls and the vote 
share of each candidate and party.   
International and national observers were present in the 2009 election and allocated random-
ly across the country. This randomization is crucial to this study and allows us to isolate the direct 
impact of the observer arriving at a given polling station on election outcomes. We shall follow the 
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customary treatment-control terminology, whereby treatment areas are the ones visited by a monitor. 
Monitors were asked not to influence local events and to fill a form with their observations. Two 
types of monitors will be taken into account: 
National fixed – Constituted by observers of the national observatory, “Observatório Eleito-
ral”, hereafter denoted as OE-PVT. Their job was to sit in a particular table inside the ballot station 
and to stay there during the entire day. They received formation prior to the election day and were 
randomized per ballot table across the country by a national NGO called EISA. 
International Mobile – International volunteers gathered from UNDP, who had a list of or-
dered locations to visit, randomly assigned by the NOVAFRICA research centre. After completing 
all tables in a given ballot station they should go the next location in the list. However, due to a re-
striction made by UNDP only certain districts could be covered. Randomization was done within 
districts, but even though they were spread from north to south, the nature of the UNDP restriction 
was biased towards more urban districts. We must take this into account when making comparisons 
between the different types of observers and proceed with care. The UNDP teams travelled by car 
and usually stayed around 15 minutes at each location, but were told to stay longer if necessary. 
There will be two different types of impacts due to the presence of observers: a 
direct and an indirect effect. To properly understand how the direct impact will affect fraudulent 
actions it is important to think about the incentives to the agents involved, and how they interpret the 
arrival of the observer. Agents can be divided in two groups: the ballot station staff and the voters. If 
a team of observers arrives at one ballot station they give a signal to both agents that not only elec-
tions are being monitored but so is that station in particular. The impact of such a signal will surely 
depend on the current state of fraud and corruption in that locality.  
If no fraud is taking place, the signal will have little to no impact, voters should vote as they 
always had, and the staff will perform their actions as before since they have no reason to fear the 
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observers. However, if fraud was to take place, or was thought to happen, two alternatives arise: ei-
ther (1) the signal causes agents to change their behaviour, for example, the staff might try to de-
crease fraudulent actions or try to change them into less perceived ones, and voters could change 
their voting patterns due to a higher confidence in the election system, or (2) the signal has no effect 
on the agents. 
I argue that if significant differences in results are found between observed, and non-observed, loca-




Not all locations that have been assigned to be monitored beforehand have been visited in the end. 
Besides data on the randomization we also had access to the forms filled by each monitor. This can 
be used to distinguish the stations with intention to treat, allocated during randomization, hereafter 
denoted apriori, from the places that actually were treated and have a filled form, hereafter called 
aposteriori. It is important to point that it isn’t a one to one comparison. During data cleansing there 
was a high number of cases with filling errors in the forms, from writing a completely different prov-
ince to simple spelling errors. The forms were also very difficult to get, some were lost in transaction 
and not all of them were delivered, therefore when using aposteriori data we must be aware that we 
are using a sample with possible error, and smaller than the real one.   
Table 2a shows the share of ballots allocated to the observers which had an associated filling 
form.  Having similar results for aposteriori data can nevertheless provide a feeling of security. Dif-
fering results can be purely a result of the lack of forms and the biases associated with wrong filling.  





Difference between Apriori and Aposteriori 
  Per table Per Station 
UNDP 0,274 0,508 
PVT 0,421 0,494 
Notes: Percentage of matched tables between intention to treat and 
treated ballot tables. The first column represents ballot tables with exact 
correspondence and second represents voting stations where at least one 
table was matched 
 
( )                    
( )                               
Where         is the dependent variable,    is a dummy for whether or not the area was ob-
served. Variables and notations are the same as specified later when we introduce our estimation 
strategy. If randomization was well implemented, then no relation between    and         should be 
found. In fact, when controlling for provinces effects, we see basically no effect.  Table 2b provides 
the coefficients of these regressions. 
The international observers were deployed by UNDP, and we can expect them to have per-
formed their monitoring obligations. We should lack forms more due to incomplete access to the 
forms filled by the monitors rather than as a result of failure to observe the ballot station. Moreover,  
we see they visited around half the schools they were supposed to visit. 
OE-PVT have a similar outline, as we see in table 1a around half of the ballot stations as-
signed have a corresponding filled form, if we take into consideration that some forms were lost and 





Having access to the ballot tables monitored allows us to perform standard treatment-control analy-
sis, where treatment areas are the ones visited by a monitor.  
As I argued previously significant differences in results indicate that agents as a whole al-
tered their behaviour upon the arrival of an observer. The question remains as whether that change 
was due to a decrease in electoral fraud. To properly answer this question we must be able to isolate 
the effect on the outcomes through voters and through the ballot table staff. 
Suppose a monitor arrives at a given location in which fraud was going to take place. The 
ballot station staff has now to make a decision, either they maintain their behaviour or they decrease 
the amount of fraud they were about to commit. If the second happens we can expect the incumbent 
to have a lower vote share than before. Moreover, according to a study on Mozambican national 
elections of 2004 (Hanlon and Fox 2006),  some of the most common electoral day fraud techniques 
are Ballot-box stuffing
4
 and the invalidation of opposition votes
5
 . Another common fraud, which 
we can also test for is the manipulation of blank votes by changing them to your preference. These 
are good candidates to test for change in corruption. It is also likely that if fraud decreases, ballot box 
stuffing should decrease as well leading to a lower amount of votes, and lower turnout for that table. 
Invalidating opposition votes should also decrease leading to higher number of null votes. Finally 
writing on blank votes could also decrease leading to a higher number of blank votes. Overall if ob-
servers decrease corruption we should see a negative effect on the incumbent share and a positive 
impact on turnout, nulls and blanks. 
The problem however is that observers may also affect voters, which by nature have differ-
ent incentives than the ballot station staff. Voters will most likely interpret the presence of observers 
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 The insertion of phantom votes in the ballot box. 
5
 The changing of votes in favour of the opposition in order for the votes to be considered invalid. 
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as a signal of trust and fairness of that election. It is quite hard to tell what would be the impact on 
different outcomes but if confidence in the election has increased it is plausible to expect an increase 
in turnout as well. We can only speculate what will be the effect on other outcomes, which could 
vary in different ways. In any case if voters’ behavioural change affect the same outcomes as the sta-
tion staff’s behaviour, fraud-deterrence will be harder to find. This “blur” caused by voters behav-
ioural change could, in theory, prevent us from observing an effect.  
However, if the effect on fraudulent activities is strong enough, we should still find signifi-
cant and coherent results. I argue that if there is an effect through voters, it will likely be in an oppo-
site direction to the staff effect on turnout and of unpredictable fashion for the other variables, in-
creasing the error term and making it harder to find statistical significance. Hill and Young (2007) 
discuss that compulsory voting increases informal votes. However, if self-selection exists in the 
sample, voters contributing to the increase in turnout are on average more informed or more educat-
ed. Then we could see a decrease in blanks and in nulls. In any case any hypothesis would remain 
highly speculative. 
In order to test for differences across treatment and control four different specifications were used: 
( )                    
( )                               
( )                                        
( )                             
Where         is the outcome variable (turnout, percentage of nulls, percentage of blanks 
and election outcomes). The independent variable,   , is a vector dummy representing whether it 
is a treatment area (observed) or not by a given vector of observers.          is a vector of geo-
graphic dummy controls, being the province to which the ballot station belongs, and a variable of 
total registered voters in that locality. It is reasonable to expect party support to vary according to 
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these variables and including them should allow us to isolate better the effect of monitoring. The 
        is the value from the last election of the regressed outcome. 
The first specification (1) is a simple OLS, the second one (2) allows to control for differ-
ences across provinces and more densely populated areas. Using these controls increases the 
chances of finding significance and to eliminate possible biases. The third specification (3) adds 
the lag of the regressed outcome. This variable allows us to control for the previous tendency of 
that locality, a location with a lower share for the incumbent could in theory behave differently 
than one with a higher share, etc. The fourth specification (4) is a basic differences-in-differences 
to control for fixed effects at each ballot location level.  All regressions are done with clusters at 
the polling station level (since data is on polling table level). Each regression will be made for two 
specifications of the dependent variable, the first will be per table and it will have the values 1 for 
each observed table and 0 otherwise, and will give the impact of monitoring a single table, the 
second will be per ballot and will have the values 1 if at least one table was observed in that ballot 
station and 0 otherwise, this will allow us to see if there are spill overs from monitoring one table 
to the other tables of that polling station even if they were not observed directly. 
As I stated before, if significant differences in results are found between observed, and 
non-observed locations, we can infer that observers affected agents’ behaviour. But since we had 
different effects on voters and staff it would be hard to tell them apart. However we have different 
types of observers, which by their nature could have different effects on the agents. 
International voters are much more likely to be noticed by voters. Since they arrive by car 
as outsiders, the chance that the population becomes aware of the fact that they came to the town 
is quite high. OE-PVT observers however, are seated in one or more tables and are Mozambicans, 
it would be hard for the population to differentiate them from other election officials present at the 
election day. I expect then that, if an effect on voters exists, it will be much higher for the UNDP 
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type monitors than for OE-PVT.  The effect on the staff is harder to differentiate between the two 
different types of observers. The UNDP observers spent a small amount of time in the polling sta-
tion, whereas the OE-PVT spent the whole day, but being an international observer could impose 
a higher threat than a national one. In any case, if national observers were not influenced or bribed 




Table 3a presents the impact of OE-PVT monitoring on the candidates/parties for the presidential 
and parliamentary elections. The results suggest that national monitors had decreased fraud since 
the vote shares decreased for the incumbent and increased for the opposition on a coherent basis.  
The basic OLS gives hints on a negative correlation between monitored tables and in-
cumbent’s share but correcting for geographic fixed effects makes this effect non-significant. 
However if we include the lag variable or use a difference-in-differences specification we find a 
negative and significative effect on the incumbent share. Areas that systematically have higher or 
lower shares may have characteristics that would affect the effectiveness of monitoring differently, 
when we correct for these effects with specifications (3) and (4) we see that monitoring has strong 
and significative negative impacts on the incumbents vote share. It seems that monitoring decreas-
es the vote share for Guebuza/Frelimo by 1-2%. Results for the opposition are not as strong. This 
could be a result of lower power (higher volatility of the opposition vote share) or evidence that 
corruption was not as harmful for the opposition as it was beneficial for the incumbent. In any case 
there is a positive correlation but it does not remain significative when we include controls. 
Table 3a and 3b supports the claim of negative effect on fraud. Just as expected we see 
significant impacts in the other outcomes with a signal coherent with the theory. The monitoring 
13 
 
effect on turnout is significant at the 1% level for nearly all specifications and has a negative im-
pact of about 2-4%. This is evidence for a decrease in ballot stuffing and shows that the OE-PVT 
effect on the staff is not diluted by a possible change in voters’ behaviour. In addition we see that 
significance levels and coefficient values are similar, though a bit smaller, when using the depend-
ent variable as per station instead of per table. A strong suggestion is that fixed monitors have co-
herent spillover effects to the other tables of same polling station.  
The impact of observers on nulls is much less evident. Despite a negative correlation after 
controlling with the lag or for ballot table specific fixed effects, with the diff-in-diff significance 
disappears.  Looking at table 3g we see that the differences between treatment and control (based 
on apriori or intention to treat) are very mild with respect to nulls. The lack of significance could 
be interpreted as not enough power in the data to untangle the effect. In any case, the results are 
inconclusive with respect to the nulls. Considering blank votes, we see something surprising. If we 
look only at the regressions with the dependent variable specified per table, we find a significant 
and strong effect for all types of regressions. However, using the dependent on a per station basis 
we get the opposite effects with apriori and aposteriori data. This could be the result of a complex 
mixture of different effects, which will be left unanswered during the present study. 
Results so far suggest that national fixed observers decrease Election Day fraud. This 
finding is of particular importance since the literature is still vague on the effect of national moni-
toring of elections. National observers were able to remain unbiased and capable to withstand 
pressure from the national government contributing to a more fair and just election in 2009. When 
reviewing the effects of UNDP-observation we will include the tables with intention to treat for 
OE-PVT, this will allow us to compare coefficients which otherwise wouldn’t be possible since 
the UNDP sample is restricted to UNDP approved districts. 
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Before any interpretation of the regressions using UNDP data, we should pay close atten-
tion to table 4a. The districts in which randomization took place are very much different from the 
rest of the country. Not only were they more urban than the rest but they also favour the incum-
bent in shares, have a higher turnout, nearly half the amount of nulls and less than half the amount 
of blanks. 
Table 4a 
  Presidential Election 
  Guebuza Dhlakama Turnout Nulls Blanks 
UNDP Districts 0,769 0,098 0,447 0,032 0,035 
Non-UNDP Districts 0,702 0,236 0,406 0,052 0,081 
 Pr(|T| > |t|)  0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 
        Parliamentary Election 
  FRELIMO RENAMO Turnout Nulls Blanks 
UNDP Districts 0,713 0,107 0,440 0,028 0,053 
Non-UNDP Districts 0,602 0,202 0,400 0,044 0,102 
 Pr(|T| > |t|)  0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 
Notes: Difference in means test between the districts chosen by UNDP to be monitored 
for the presidential and parliamentary election 
 
It becomes evident that it is not wise to make hasty conclusions and expect them to be val-
id for the rest of the country. We should also be aware that due to the nature of mobile observa-
tions, results are likely to be more significant using the dependent variable at station level. Since 
forms were lost, chances are high that at least one of the tables remains in possession hence biases 
occur with a higher chance in per table configurations. 
In table 3c and 3d we have the impact of UNDP and OE-PVT monitoring on the shares of 
main candidates and parties for the selected districts. Contrarily to what happens on a national lev-
el for OE-PVT, this type of monitors are no longer significant and international monitors appear to 
favour the incumbent for specifications (1), (2) and (3), and to disfavour in (4). This result is very 
difficult to explain. We know that the aposteriori data indicates that only half of the places were 
visited, implying that inconsistencies between intention-to-treat and treated areas shouldn’t be sur-
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prising. However accounting for inconsistencies for the same type of data is not expected. It will 
remain inconclusive what is the true effect of the observer. Looking at table 3e and 3f we can see 
more revealing data. OE-PVT remains overall significant when we do not control for ballot-table 
specific fixed effects and not so much if we try to control for it. Nevertheless it remains coherent 
with the idea that PVT reduces ballot-stuffing. For both the nulls and blank vote shares, national 
monitors have no effect using a 5% significance level.  
UNDP observers seem to have a much higher, more significant impact on the nulls, with negative 
significant coefficients for nearly all the specifications at the station level, which as mentioned ear-
lier are more trustworthy than table level ones.The effect on blanks is not as significant and is con-
trary to what we would expect (higher number of blanks in treated areas due to a decrease in 
fraud). Giving a higher weight to aposteriori data we consistent significance across most of the 
specifications is not present. We cannot conclude that fraud is being reduced with respect to the 
number of blank votes, as not only are they always significant but they also have opposite signs. 
The effect on turnout is another surprise. We see no significance if we do not control for 
ballot table specific fixed effects but doing such controls leads to some positive and significative 
effects. Once again this is against the hypothesis that either they decreased fraud and we would see 
lower turnout due to lower values of ballot stuffing or we wouldn’t see an impact at all. 
Explaining these differences is a very hard task as multiple explanations can arise. However one 
explanation stands above the others. The effect on voters’ behaviour was not being taken into ac-
count. According to my previous statement this effect should be more evident for UNDP moni-
tors. In fact PVT monitoring has either no evidence of fraud reduction or a mild one in some of the 
outcomes such as the turnout. Contrarily to international voters, who show a possible positive 
turnout effect, together with a positive effect on voters’ confidence in the electoral system. The 
negative impact on informal votes (nulls and blanks) is also be explained by voters’ confidence. 
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Therefore we cannot conclude if UNDP monitors decrease corruption but we were able to find ev-
idence that international and national observers affect the agents involved in the election, where in-
ternational were able to have a stronger impact in voters’ behaviour than national fixed observers. 
 
Conclusions 
In this paper we concluded that national fixed observers could perform better than international 
observers in certain occasions. We found evidence of two channels through which electoral ob-
servation changes election day results: (a) Through a change in voters’ behaviour (b)  Through a 
change in the ballot table staff’s behaviour. 
  International observers were found to have a more evident impact on voters’ behaviour 
than the national monitors, but this difference can also be attributed to the nature of the observa-
tion and not only to the nationality, i.e. international observers were mobile and arrived by car 
while nationals were fixed and were the entire day seated at one of the tables. 
Both observers could have a fraud-deterrent effect but strong evidence is only found in fa-
vour of the national or fixed observers. 
Further research should be performed in order to disentangle the two effects. Moreover, 
the discovery of fraud-deterrence effects from national monitors should also be developed further. 
The policy implications of such an effect are tremendous. Instead of funding and supporting inter-
national monitoring programs, donors could, as an alternative, support national political-
independent monitoring programs.  
The significance of national observers also increases our faith in Mozambique’s democra-
cy. Despite accusations of fraud and the usual problems associated with lack of conditions for 
elections in a poor and developing country, they are able to have a truly independent election 
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533 1130 782,55 
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159 808 894,4614 
Maputo Provín-




353 848 747,6722 




757 2113 828,1697 




431 761 707,4717 




295 962 843,9054 




675 1038 691,1175 




642 2059 877,9441 
Notes: Tables 2a shows observer coverage per province for locations with intention to treat for each observer.  
          Table 2b 
Balance - Presidential 
  Turnout Nulls Brancos Guebuza Dhlakama 
  Per table Per Station Per Station Per table Per table Per Station Per Station Per table Per table Per Station 
UNDP - 
Apriori 
-0,009 0,005 -0,001 -0,002 0,001 -0,000 -0,026** -0,002 0,022** 0,002 
(0,009) (0,008) (0,002) (0,002) (0,001) (0,001) (0,012) (0,007) (0,011) (0,007) 
UNDP - 
Apost 
-0,014 0,015 0,003 0,001 0,003 -0,001 -0,039** 0,005 0,030* -0,005 
(0,012) (0,011) (0,003) (0,003) (0,002) (0,002) (0,017) (0,011) (0,017) (0,012) 
OE PVT 
- Apriori 
0,002 0,006 -0,000 0,002 -0,003 0,001 0,048* 0,020* -0,042* -0,021** 
(0,010) (0,009) (0,003) (0,002) (0,002) (0,001) (0,026) (0,011) (0,022) (0,009) 
OE PVT 
- Apost 
-0,004 -0,005 0,002 0,002 -0,003* -0,001 0,102*** 0,006 -0,096*** -0,008 
(0,014) (0,012) (0,005) (0,003) (0,002) (0,002) (0,026) (0,009) (0,022) (0,009) 
Control No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Balance  Parliamentary 
 
Turnout Nulls Brancos Guebuza Dhlakama 
 
Per table Per Station Per Station Per table Per table Per Station Per Station Per table Per table Per Station 
UNDP - 
Apriori 
-0,014 0,002 -0,001 -0,002 0,002 -0,001 -0,025** -0,001 0,021** 0,003 
(0,009) (0,008) (0,002) (0,002) (0,002) (0,002) (0,011) (0,007) (0,010) (0,006) 
UNDP - 
Apost 
-0,019 0,011 0,006 0,001 0,003 -0,003 -0,042** 0,006 0,026* -0,004 
(0,012) (0,011) (0,004) (0,004) (0,003) (0,002) (0,016) (0,011) (0,015) (0,010) 
OE PVT 
- Apriori 
0,003 0,008 -0,001 0,002 -0,008 -0,002 0,050* 0,022* -0,039* -0,022** 
(0,010) (0,008) (0,004) (0,003) (0,003) (0,002) (0,024) (0,011) (0,020) (0,009) 
OE PVT 
- Apost 
0,004 0,003 0,001 0,001 -0,006* -0,004 0,098*** 0,013 -0,088*** -0,008 
(0,015) (0,013) (0,006) (0,003) (0,003) (0,002) (0,025) (0,009) (0,020) (0,008) 
Control No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Notes: Coefficients from balance regressions. Standard errors are presented below between brackets for each coefficient. Simple OLS were made with or without con-
trols. Significance levels are given by : *=p<0,1 ; **=p<0,05 ; ***p<0,001 








PVT Obverservers effect on Final Outcomes 
Apriori 
Guebuza   
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Per table Per station Per table Per station Per table Per station Per table Per station 
  
        
Apriori 
-0,027*** -0,027*** -0,007 -0,001 -0,013** -0,011** -0,008 -0,022** 
(0,008) (0,008) (0,006) (0,006) (0,006) (0,005) (0,008) (0,009) 
_cons 0,723 0,728 0,539 0,539 0,353 0,362 0,143 0,148 
Lag of depen-
dent variable 




R2 Adjusted 12 275 12 275 12 275 12 275 7 673 7 673 7 673 7 673 
N 0,001 0,003 0,437 0,437 0,639 0,639 -0,000 0,003 
Aposteriori 
-0,031*** -0,031*** 0,002 0,009 -0,013 -0,009 -0,003 -0,012 
(0,012) (0,011) (0,009) (0,008) (0,009) (0,007) (0,011) (0,010) 
_cons 0,723 0,726 0,538 0,537 0,353 0,361 0,142 0,144 
Lag of depen-
dent variable 




N 12 275 12 275 12 275 12 275 7 673 7 673 7 673 7 673 
R2 Adjusted 0,001 0,002 0,437 0,438 0,637 0,640 -0,000 0,000 
Controls No Yes Yes No 
Lag No No Yes No 
Diff No No No Yes 
Apriori 
Dhlakama   
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Per table Per station Per table Per station Per table Per station Per table Per station 
  
        
Apriori 
0,021*** 0,008 0,006 -0,001 0,008 0,005 0,004 -0,009 
(0,008) (0,008) (0,006) (0,007) (0,006) (0,006) (0,008) (0,007) 
_cons 0,194 0,194 0,411 0,412 0,101 0,114 -0,119 -0,116 
Lag of depen-
dent variable 




N 12 275 12 275 12 275 12 275 7 673 7 673 7 673 7 673 
R2 Adjusted 0,001 0,000 0,416 0,416 0,635 0,635 -0,000 0,000 
Aposteriori 
0,037*** 0,023** -0,001 -0,010 0,013 -0,000 0,021* -0,000 
(0,012) (0,011) (0,009) (0,008) (0,008) (0,007) (0,011) (0,010) 
_cons 0,194 0,192 0,412 0,413 0,101 0,115 -0,119 -0,118 
Lag of depen-
dent variable 




N 12 275 12 275 12 275 12 275 7 673 7 673 7 673 7 673 
R2 Adjusted 0,001 0,001 0,416 0,417 0,635 0,635 0,000 -0,000 
Controls No Yes Yes No 
Lag No No Yes No 
Diff No No No Yes 
Notes: Regressions of OE-PVT monitoring on the vote share of the presidential candidates. Specification (1) is a simple OLS, (2) includes geographical 
controls such as dummies for provinces and the number of registered voters in that locality, (3) includes the geographical controls plus a the lag of the 
dependent variable and (4) is a basic dif-in-dif where last period is considered to be the value fo elections of 2004. For each relevant variable we have its 
cofficient and the correspond standard error between brackets below. Clusters were included by school. Constant was not provided with standard er-




PVT Obverservers effect on Final Outcomes 
Apriori 
Frelimo   
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Per table Per station Per table Per station Per table Per station Per table Per station 
  
        
Apriori 
-0,026*** -0,011 -0,006 0,008 -0,011* -0,008* -0,010 -0,015** 
(0,008) (0,010) (0,006) (0,007) (0,006) (0,005) (0,007) (0,007) 
_cons 0,635 0,636 0,430 0,428 0,253 0,250 0,095 0,099 
Lag of depen-
dent variable 




N 12 104 12 104 12 104 12 104 7 542 7 542 7 542 7 542 
R2 Adjusted 0,001 0,000 0,475 0,475 0,690 0,690 0,000 0,002 
Aposteriori 
-0,041*** -0,027** -0,002 0,012 -0,017** -0,006 -0,015 -0,011 
(0,012) (0,011) (0,008) (0,008) (0,008) (0,006) (0,009) (0,008) 
_cons 0,635 0,637 0,429 0,428 0,254 0,249 0,142 0,144 
Lag of depen-
dent variable 




N 12 104 12 104 12 104 12 104 7 542 7 542 7 673 7 673 
R2 Adjusted 0,001 0,000 0,476 0,476 0,690 0,691 -0,000 0,000 
Controls No Yes Yes No 
Lag No No Yes No 




(1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Per table Per station Per table Per station Per table Per station Per table Per station 
  
        
Apriori 
0,018*** 0,013* 0,005 0,002 0,007 0,005 0,003 -0,005 
(0,006) (0,007) (0,005) (0,005) (0,005) (0,004) (0,007) (0,007) 
_cons 0,173 0,172 0,337 0,337 0,115 0,117 -0,109 -0,108 
Lag of depen-
dent variable 




N 12 104 12 104 12 104 12 104 7 542 7 542 7 542 7 542 
R2 Adjusted 0,001 0,001 0,423 0,423 0,616 0,616 -0,000 0,000 
Aposteriori 
0,026*** 0,022*** -0,005 -0,008 0,007 -0,000 0,013 0,002 
(0,009) (0,008) (0,007) (0,006) (0,006) (0,005) (0,009) (0,009) 
_cons 0,174 0,172 0,337 0,338 0,115 0,118 -0,109 -0,109 
Lag of depen-
dent variable 




N 12 104 12 104 12 104 12 104 7 542 7 542 7 542 7 542 
R2 Adjusted 0,001 0,002 0,423 0,423 0,616 0,616 0,000 -0,000 
Controls No Yes Yes No 
Lag No No Yes No 
Diff No No No Yes 
Notes: Regressions of OE-PVT monitoring on the vote share of the parliamentary main parties. Specification (1) is a simple OLS, (2) includes ge-
ographical controls such as dummies for provinces and the number of registered voters in that locality, (3) includes the geographical controls 
plus a the lag of the dependent variable and (4) is a basic dif-in-dif where last period is considered to be the value fo elections of 2004. For each 
relevant variable we have its coefficient and the correspond standard error between brackets below. Clusters were included by school. Con-




UNDP Observers effect on Final Outcomes 
 
Guebuza   Frelimo   





























              
  
Apriori 
0,033*** 0,033*** 0,033*** 0,033*** 0,026*** 0,026*** -0,007 -0,007 0,033*** 0,033*** 0,039*** 0,039*** 0,029*** 0,029*** -0,010 -0,010 
(0,011) (0,011) (0,008) (0,008) (0,010) (0,010) (0,015) (0,015) (0,011) (0,011) (0,008) (0,008) (0,009) (0,009) (0,014) (0,014) 
OE-PVT 
-0,006 -0,006 0,011 0,011 0,012 0,012 0,031 0,031 -0,018 -0,018 0,001 0,001 0,002 0,002 0,015 0,015 




- - - - 
0,357*** 0,357*** 
- - - - - - 
0,443*** 0,443*** 
- - 
(0,040) (0,040) (0,035) (0,035) 
_cons 0,763 0,763 0,655 0,655 0,501 0,501 0,082 0,082 0,706 0,706 0,533 0,533 0,350 0,350 0,063 0,063 
N 3 646 3 646 3 646 3 646 2 473 2 473 2 473 2 473 3 635 3 635 3 635 3 635 2 424 2 424 2 424 2 424 
R2 Adjus-
ted 
0,006 0,006 0,554 0,554 0,638 0,638 0,001 0,001 0,006 0,006 0,576 0,576 0,683 0,683 0,000 0,000 
Apriori 





0,071*** 0,073*** 0,011 0,008 0,003 -0,003 -0,022* 
-
0,052*** 
(0,011) (0,010) (0,009) (0,008) (0,008) (0,007) (0,014) (0,012) (0,012) (0,010) (0,009) (0,009) (0,007) (0,007) (0,012) (0,011) 
OE-PVT 
-0,010 -0,009 0,010 0,009 0,012 0,013 0,034 0,036* -0,022 -0,022 -0,000 -0,000 0,002 0,002 0,016 0,017 




- - - - 
0,364*** 0,365*** 
- - - - - - 
0,452*** 0,452*** 
- - 
(0,040) (0,041) (0,035) (0,035) 
_cons 0,765 0,761 0,662 0,662 0,504 0,503 0,084 0,096 0,707 0,699 0,540 0,541 0,353 0,352 0,063 0,071 
N 3 646 3 646 3 646 3 646 2 473 2 473 2 473 2 473 3 635 3 635 3 635 3 635 2 424 2 424 2 424 2 424 
R2 Adjus-
ted 
0,008 0,011 0,549 0,549 0,635 0,636 0,006 0,041 0,014 0,029 0,568 0,568 0,679 0,679 0,001 0,022 
Control No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No 
Lag No No Yes No No No Yes No 
Diff No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Notes: Regressions of UNDP and OE-PVT monitoring on the vote share of the Guebuza/Frelimo in presidential and parliamentary elections. Specification (1) is a simple OLS, (2) includes geographical controls 
such as dummies for provinces and the number of registered voters in that locality, (3) includes the geographical controls plus a the lag of the dependent variable and (4) is a basic dif-in-dif where last period is con-
sidered to be the value fo elections of 2004. For each relevant variable we have its cofficient and the correspond standard error between brackets below. Clusters were included by school. Constant was not provided 




                
Table 3d 
UNDP Observers effect on Final Outcomes 
Apriori 
Dhlakama   Renamo   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 

























      
  
      
  
Apriori 
-0,015* -0,015* -0,010* -0,010* 0,001 0,001 0,026* 0,026* -0,013* -0,013* -0,005 -0,005 0,003 0,003 0,022* 0,022* 
(0,008) (0,008) (0,006) (0,006) (0,006) (0,006) (0,014) (0,014) (0,008) (0,008) (0,005) (0,005) (0,005) (0,005) (0,013) (0,013) 
OE-PVT 
0,023 0,023 -0,000 -0,000 -0,004 -0,004 -0,013 -0,013 0,021 0,021 -0,004 -0,004 -0,003 -0,003 -0,012 -0,012 













(0,035) (0,035) (0,030) (0,030) 
_cons 0,101 0,101 0,270 0,270 0,123 0,123 -0,148 -0,148 0,109 0,109 0,250 0,250 0,139 0,139 -0,128 -0,128 
N 3 646 3 646 3 646 3 646 2 473 2 473 2 473 2 473 3 635 3 635 3 635 3 635 2 424 2 424 2 424 2 424 
R2 Adjus-
ted 









(0,010) (0,007) (0,008) (0,006) (0,005) (0,004) (0,011) (0,011) (0,008) (0,007) (0,006) (0,005) (0,004) (0,004) (0,010) (0,010) 
OE-PVT 
0,024 0,024 0,000 0,000 -0,004 -0,003 -0,016 -0,017 0,022* 0,022* -0,004 -0,004 -0,003 -0,003 -0,017 -0,015 













(0,035) (0,035) (0,030) (0,030) 
_cons 0,099 0,104 0,269 0,269 0,123 0,123 -0,150 -0,159 0,108 0,109 0,249 0,249 0,140 0,140 -0,130 -0,140 
N 3 646 3 646 3 646 3 646 2 473 2 473 2 473 2 473 3 635 3 635 3 635 3 635 2 424 2 424 2 424 2 424 
R2 Adjus-
ted 
0,003 0,012 0,441 0,441 0,595 0,595 0,014 0,034 0,001 0,003 0,512 0,512 0,649 0,649 0,017 0,042 
Control No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No 
Lag No No Yes No No No Yes No 
Diff No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Notes: Regressions of UNDP and OE-PVT monitoring on the vote share of Dhakama/Renamo in presidential and parliamentary elections. Specification (1) is a simple OLS, (2) includes geographical controls such as 
dummies for provinces and the number of registered voters in that locality, (3) includes the geographical controls plus a the lag of the dependent variable and (4) is a basic dif-in-dif where last period is considered to 
be the value fo elections of 2004. For each relevant variable we have its cofficient and the correspond standard error between brackets below. Clusters were included by school. Constant was not provided with stand-




UNDP Observers effect on Final Outcomes 
  
  Turnout Presidential Nulls Presidential Blanks Presidential 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
    
            
Apriori 
Per table 
0,015 0,008 0,008 0,021* -0,002 -0,001 -0,001 -0,002 -0,007*** -0,004** -0,003* -0,005** 
(0,009) (0,008) (0,008) (0,011) (0,002) (0,002) (0,002) (0,003) (0,002) (0,002) (0,002) (0,002) 
PVT 
-0,056*** -0,023*** -0,019* -0,033 0,009* 0,008* 0,010 0,005 0,009 0,004 0,001 0,004 
(0,015) (0,009) (0,011) (0,024) (0,005) (0,005) (0,007) (0,007) (0,007) (0,005) (0,004) (0,005) 
Mean 0,445*** 0,293*** 0,237*** 0,034*** 0,033*** 0,051*** 0,042*** 0,003** 0,036*** 0,105*** 0,084*** 0,016*** 
Per stati-
on 
0,015 0,008 0,008 0,021* -0,002 -0,001 -0,001 -0,002 -0,007*** -0,004** -0,003* -0,005** 
(0,009) (0,008) (0,008) (0,011) (0,002) (0,002) (0,002) (0,003) (0,002) (0,002) (0,002) (0,002) 
  
PVT 
-0,056*** -0,023*** -0,019* -0,033 0,009* 0,008* 0,010 0,005 0,009 0,004 0,001 0,004 
  (0,015) (0,009) (0,011) (0,024) (0,005) (0,005) (0,007) (0,007) (0,007) (0,005) (0,004) (0,005) 
  Mean 0,445*** 0,293*** 0,237*** 0,034*** 0,033*** 0,051*** 0,042*** 0,003** 0,036*** 0,105*** 0,084*** 0,016*** 
Aposteriori 
Per table 
0,009 0,014* 0,019** 0,024* -0,006*** -0,004** -0,003 -0,008** -0,006** -0,003 0,001 -0,001 
(0,010) (0,008) (0,008) (0,013) (0,002) (0,002) (0,002) (0,003) (0,003) (0,002) (0,002) (0,002) 
PVT 
-0,057*** -0,024*** -0,019* -0,034 0,010* 0,008* 0,010 0,005 0,009 0,004 0,001 0,004 
(0,015) (0,009) (0,011) (0,024) (0,005) (0,005) (0,007) (0,007) (0,007) (0,005) (0,004) (0,005) 
Mean 0,448*** 0,294*** 0,238*** 0,037*** 0,033*** 0,051*** 0,042*** 0,003*** 0,035*** 0,104*** 0,083*** 0,015*** 
Per stati-
on 
0,007 0,010 0,014* 0,022** -0,010*** -0,004*** -0,003** -0,005** -0,011*** -0,003 0,001 -0,004** 
(0,009) (0,008) (0,008) (0,011) (0,001) (0,001) (0,001) (0,002) (0,003) (0,002) (0,002) (0,002) 
  
PVT 
-0,056*** -0,023*** -0,019* -0,034 0,010* 0,008* 0,010 0,005 0,009 0,004 0,001 0,004 
  (0,015) (0,009) (0,011) (0,024) (0,005) (0,005) (0,007) (0,007) (0,007) (0,005) (0,004) (0,005) 
  Mean 0,447*** 0,294*** 0,239*** 0,034*** 0,034*** 0,051*** 0,042*** 0,004*** 0,037*** 0,104*** 0,083*** 0,016*** 
  N 3 643 3 643 2 472 2 472 3 646 3 646 2 473 2 473 3 646 3 646 2 473 2 473 
Notes: Regressions of UNDP and OE-PVT monitoring on the outcomes for turnout, nulls and blanks in presidential elections. Specification (1) is a simple OLS, (2) includes geograph-
ical controls such as dummies for provinces and the number of registered voters in that locality, (3) includes the geographical controls plus a the lag of the dependent variable and (4) is 
a basic dif-in-dif where last period is considered to be the value fo elections of 2004. For each relevant variable we have its cofficient and the correspond standard error between brack-




UNDP Observers effect on Final Outcomes 
  
  Turnout Parliamentary Nulls Parlamiantary Blanks Parliamentary 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
    
            
Apriori 
Per table 
0,013 0,006 0,010 0,021* -0,002 -0,001 -0,001 -0,001 -0,010*** -0,006*** -0,004 -0,003 
(0,009) (0,007) (0,008) (0,011) (0,002) (0,002) (0,003) (0,003) (0,003) (0,002) (0,002) (0,003) 
PVT -0,053*** -0,020** -0,013 -0,016 0,004 0,003 0,007 0,003 0,012 0,005 -0,001 0,006 
  (0,014) (0,009) (0,011) (0,023) (0,006) (0,005) (0,008) (0,008) (0,008) (0,005) (0,005) (0,007) 
Mean 0,438*** 0,287*** 0,230*** 0,027*** 0,028*** 0,038*** 0,028*** -0,005*** 0,055*** 0,135*** 0,117*** 0,019*** 
Per stati-
on 
0,013 0,006 0,010 0,021* -0,002 -0,001 -0,001 -0,001 -0,010*** -0,006*** -0,004 -0,003 
(0,009) (0,007) (0,008) (0,011) (0,002) (0,002) (0,003) (0,003) (0,003) (0,002) (0,002) (0,003) 
  PVT -0,053*** -0,020** -0,013 -0,016 0,004 0,003 0,007 0,003 0,012 0,005 -0,001 0,006 
    (0,014) (0,009) (0,011) (0,023) (0,006) (0,005) (0,008) (0,008) (0,008) (0,005) (0,005) (0,007) 
  Mean 0,438*** 0,287*** 0,230*** 0,027*** 0,028*** 0,038*** 0,028*** -0,005*** 0,055*** 0,135*** 0,117*** 0,019*** 
Aposteriori 
Per table 
0,009 0,014 0,018** 0,013 -0,007*** -0,004** -0,004** -0,009** -0,003 -0,005* -0,001 0,003 
(0,010) (0,008) (0,008) (0,013) (0,002) (0,002) (0,002) (0,004) (0,003) (0,003) (0,003) (0,004) 
PVY -0,054*** -0,021** -0,014 -0,017 0,004 0,003 0,007 0,004 0,013 0,005 -0,001 0,005 
  (0,014) (0,009) (0,011) (0,023) (0,006) (0,005) (0,008) (0,008) (0,008) (0,005) (0,005) (0,007) 
Mean 0,440*** 0,287*** 0,232*** 0,030*** 0,028*** 0,038*** 0,028*** -0,005*** 0,053*** 0,134*** 0,116*** 0,018*** 
Per stati-
on 
0,004 0,009 0,012 0,014 -0,010*** -0,004*** -0,003** -0,004 -0,010*** -0,005* -0,002 0,002 
(0,009) (0,008) (0,008) (0,011) (0,001) (0,001) (0,001) (0,003) (0,003) (0,003) (0,003) (0,003) 
  PVT -0,053*** -0,020** -0,013 -0,016 0,004 0,003 0,007 0,004 0,013 0,005 -0,001 0,006 
    (0,014) (0,009) (0,011) (0,023) (0,006) (0,005) (0,008) (0,008) (0,008) (0,005) (0,005) (0,007) 
  Mean 0,440*** 0,288*** 0,232*** 0,028*** 0,030*** 0,038*** 0,028*** -0,005*** 0,055*** 0,134*** 0,116*** 0,018*** 
  N 3 630 3 630 2 399 2 399 3 577 3 577 2 382 2 382 3 577 3 577 2 382 2 382 
Controls No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No 
Lag No No Yes No No No Yes No No No Yes No 
Diff No No No Yes No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Notes: Regressions of UNDP and OE-PVT monitoring on the outcomes for turnout, nulls and blanks in presidential elections. Specification (1) is a simple OLS, (2) includes geograph-
ical controls such as dummies for provinces and the number of registered voters in that locality, (3) includes the geographical controls plus a the lag of the dependent variable and (4) is 
a basic dif-in-dif where last period is considered to be the value fo elections of 2004. For each relevant variable we have its cofficient and the correspond standard error between brack-
ets below. Clusters were included by school. Constant was not provided with standard errors. Significance values are determined by: * = p<0,1 ; **=p<0,05 ;  ***=p<0,01 
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Table 3g - OE - PVT Observers effect on Final Outcomes 
  
  Turnout Presidential Nulls Presidential Blanks Parliamentary 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Apriori 
Per table 
-0,045*** -0,026*** -0,026*** -0,033*** -0,003* -0,003* -0,002 -0,001 0,007*** 0,004** 0,006** 0,008*** 
(0,006) (0,005) (0,006) (0,009) (0,002) (0,002) (0,002) (0,003) (0,003) (0,002) (0,002) (0,003) 
Mean 0,421 0,293 0,226 0,030 0,047 0,063 0,051 0,007 0,067 0,117 0,093 0,034 
Per station 
-0,041*** -0,019*** -0,014*** -0,009 -0,006*** -0,004** -0,003 0,001 -0,006*** -0,004** 0,002 0,000 
(0,005) (0,005) (0,005) (0,006) (0,002) (0,002) (0,002) (0,002) (0,002) (0,002) (0,002) (0,002) 
  Mean 0,428 0,295 0,227 0,030 0,048 0,063 0,051 0,006 0,069 0,118 0,093 0,034 
Aposteriori 
Per table 
-0,047*** -0,010 -0,017** -0,032** 0,001 -0,001 -0,001 -0,001 0,019*** 0,007*** 0,007** 0,016*** 
(0,008) (0,007) (0,008) (0,013) (0,002) (0,002) (0,003) (0,004) (0,003) (0,003) (0,003) (0,004) 
Mean 0,420 0,292 0,225 0,029 0,046 0,062 0,050 0,007 0,067 0,117 0,093 0,034 
Per station 
-0,057*** -0,015*** -0,010* -0,013 -0,004** -0,005** -0,005** -0,001 0,007* 0,000 0,001 0,005* 
(0,007) (0,005) (0,006) (0,008) (0,002) (0,002) (0,002) (0,002) (0,003) (0,003) (0,002) (0,003) 
  Mean 0,425 0,294 0,226 0,030 0,047 0,063 0,051 0,007 0,067 0,117 0,093 0,034 
  N 12 222 12 222 7 644 7 644 12 275 12 275 7 673 7 673 12 275 12 275 7 673 7 673 
  
  Turnout Parliamentary Nulls Parliamentary Blanks Parliamentary 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
    
            
Apriori 
Per table 
-0,045*** -0,026*** -0,028*** -0,033*** -0,003 -0,003 -0,002 -0,001 0,008*** 0,005** 0,007*** 0,010*** 
(0,006) (0,005) (0,006) (0,009) (0,002) (0,002) (0,002) (0,003) (0,003) (0,002) (0,003) (0,003) 
Mean 0,413 0,289 0,225 0,022 0,039 0,052 0,035 -0,009 0,088 0,137 0,107 0,032 
Per station 
-0,041*** -0,019*** -0,016*** -0,010 -0,005** -0,004* -0,001 0,004* -0,007*** -0,004* 0,001 0,002 
(0,005) (0,005) (0,005) (0,006) (0,002) (0,002) (0,002) (0,002) (0,003) (0,002) (0,002) (0,002) 
  Mean 0,419 0,291 0,227 0,022 0,040 0,052 0,035 -0,010 0,090 0,138 0,108 0,033 
Aposteriori 
Per table 
-0,049*** -0,013** -0,017** -0,031** -0,001 -0,002 0,000 -0,004 0,021*** 0,008** 0,008** 0,017*** 
(0,008) (0,006) (0,008) (0,012) (0,002) (0,002) (0,003) (0,004) (0,004) (0,003) (0,004) (0,004) 
Mean 0,412 0,288 0,224 0,021 0,039 0,052 0,035 -0,009 0,087 0,137 0,107 0,032 
Per station 
-0,058*** -0,017*** -0,014** -0,015* -0,004** -0,005** -0,003 -0,001 0,009** 0,002 0,003 0,009*** 
(0,007) (0,005) (0,006) (0,008) (0,002) (0,002) (0,002) (0,003) (0,004) (0,003) (0,003) (0,003) 
  Mean 0,418 0,290 0,226 0,022 0,040 0,052 0,036 -0,009 0,087 0,137 0,107 0,032 
  N 12 046 12 046 7 377 7 377 12 046 12 046 7 500 7 500 12 046 12 046 7 500 7 500 
Controls No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No 
Lag No No Yes No No No Yes No No No Yes No 
Diff No No No Yes No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Notes: Regressions of OE-PVT monitoring on the outcomes for turnout, nulls and blanks in presidential elections. Specification (1) is a simple OLS, (2) includes geographical controls such as dummies for provinces and the number of regis-
tered voters in that locality, (3) includes the geographical controls plus a the lag of the dependent variable and (4) is a basic dif-in-dif where last period is considered to be the value fo elections of 2004. For each relevant variable we have its 
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